Polygon’s proposed POL recovery fork: freezing addresses versus changing balances

Historical report: Odaily published this account on November 5, 2026, at 13:36 Beijing time. The Polygon governance discussion described below was scheduled for later that day; the source does not report its outcome.

What would change if the proposal passed? Polymarket and Binance proposed a Polygon PoS hard fork that would remove approximately 70.49 million POL from five frozen addresses linked to two reported security incidents and credit the same amount to recovery addresses they designated. The proposed balance changes would leave POL’s total supply unchanged. Odaily put the tokens’ value at approximately $6.7 million when describing the proposal, and approximately $6.5 million later in its analysis.

Odaily reported that Polymarket’s front end and a Binance hot wallet were compromised on October 30. Polygon validators subsequently froze four addresses linked to the Polymarket incident, holding 23.86 million POL, and one linked to the Binance incident, holding 46.63 million POL. According to the proposal as described by Odaily, Polymarket received no response when it sought the attackers’ cooperation; the proposal also alleged that attackers offered Polygon validators cash to unfreeze addresses. Polymarket and Binance were due to present their case at a Polygon protocol governance meeting at 22:30 Beijing time on November 5. As of publication, Odaily reported no public position from Polygon officials, relevant governance members or core developers.

The distinction is between restricting transactions from an address and changing its balance without its holder’s signature. Only the latter was the proposed hard-fork recovery mechanism. Polymarket and Binance said the measure would apply solely to these incidents and should not establish a general recovery process. Odaily reported that both had already fully compensated affected users; its view that the fork was unlikely to proceed was an assessment, not a governance decision.

For context, Odaily compared two earlier interventions. Following the 2016 The DAO exploit, Ethereum hard-forked to move roughly 3.6 million ETH into a refund contract; opposition to that decision continued on the chain that became Ethereum Classic. Odaily also reported that Core Network announced a November 2 hard fork to recover 68,146,177.22 CORE—about 70.2% of the CORE affected by an October 31 incident—through a one-time state adjustment. Those examples show that balance intervention has precedents, but do not establish what Polygon would decide.

Source: odaily.news (originally published 2026-11-05 13:36 UTC+8)